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The provision for special and differential treatment favoring developing economies in 
multilateral trade agreements recognizes that countries compete on an unequal footing.
Special and differential treatment can be traced to early development theories and to the 
reports of the preparatory committee for the formation of the International Trade Organization (ITO).
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947) addressed developing countries’ 
needs for an asymmetrical treatment in international trade relations. Later on, the incorporation of 
Annex IV to the GATT (1964) provided for the first time a legal framework that could be used to 
address developing countries’ concerns over trade liberalization and economic integration. The Tokyo 
Round (1973-1979) introduced, in its enabling clause, the specific term “special and differential 
treatment.”
The following round of trade negotiations, the Uruguay Round, changed the conception of 
special and differential treatment by focusing the discussion on the “treatment” these countries should 
be granted in order to become part of the international order. The Marrakech Declaration (1994) 
which created the World Trade Organization (WTO) recognized that special and differential 
treatment is an integral part of the World Trade Organization. The modalities for special and 
differential treatment in the WTO agreement include: (i) provisions to increase trade opportunities 
through greater market access; (ii) provisions to safeguard the interests of developing economies; and 
(iii) provisions to increase the flexibility and the extension of developing economies to comply with 
trade commitments. More recently, the Doha Ministerial Declaration (9-14 November 2001), which 
opens the way for a new trade negotiations round, reaffirmed the need for special and differential 
treatment and stated that its provisions must be revised to make them more precise, effective and 
operational.
This document analyzes special and differential treatment from the perspective of different 
trade agreements. These include both intraregional and extraregional trade agreements as well as 
market access preference schemes, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). It then provides an empirical estimation of the impact of special and 
differential treatment for Caribbean economies. The results indicate a lack of correspondence between 
the export structure of Caribbean economies shaped, partly, by special and differential provisions and 
the productive potential of Caribbean economies.
More to the point, special and differential treatment has not been associated with increasing 
market share, higher export growth, or with a greater diversification of the export base. As it stands, it 
has reinforced and perhaps determined a pattern of trade flows that does not correspond to the 
changes actually occurring in the production sphere. This pattern of trade flows is characterized by 
reliance on natural resource exports and low labor costs.
On the basis of the previous analyses the document delineates the foundations for a 
meaningful approach to special and differential treatment and discusses appropriate special and 
differential provisions for smaller economies. This last set of provisions could form the basis for a 
special and differential framework for the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement.
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Introduction
There has been a long-standing unresolved debate among economists on whether 
free trade promotes growth in developing countries (Theberge, 1968; Helleiner, 1972, 
Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001), and if not, what measures must be put in place to provide 
appropriate treatment for developing countries. Those who see a positive relationship 
between free trade and growth, essentially, are of the view that long-run efficiency gains 
from global trade liberalization promote growth by ensuring a more efficient and productive 
use of resources, with producers and consumers benefiting from cheaper imports and 
expanded exports. This improved productivity and increased resource use stimulates 
investment and innovation, creating a virtuous cycle of economic growth.
According to the logic of this argument, the latest global trade negotiations, (the 
Uruguay Round) ought to have resulted in significant growth in the global economy and in 
trade liberalizing countries. Estimates of the impact of the Uruguay Round on developing 
countries range from $13 billion to $125 billion per annum in increased income per year (in 
1992 dollars). These studies make the startling assertion that the gains accruing to 
developing countries, measured as a percentage of GDP, exceed the benefits to be realised 
by industrial countries (Hertel et al., 1996).
Others who conclude that there is “little evidence that open trade policies -- in the 
sense of lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade -- are significantly associated with 
economic growth”, however, dispute such claims (Rodriquez and Rodrik, 1999). Rodrik has 
suggested that macroeconomic stability, human resources, investment and good governance 
should be the focus of developing countries seeking enhanced economic growth. (Rodrik,
1999). The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its own survey of 110 developing 
countries for the decade 1985-1995 concedes that trade liberalisation is only one of several 
factors, which contribute to economic growth (IMF, May 1997, Chapter IV).
Many of those who see little direct correlation between free trade and economic 
growth in developing countries also argue that preferential measures must therefore be 
granted by developed countries within the context of free trade agreements to “compensate” 
for developing country “disadvantages” in these trading arrangements. These measures 
come under the rubric of “special and differential treatment” (S&D treatment). While over 
time, S&D measures have come to be included in trade agreements, in recent years, 
developed countries have been increasingly reluctant to provide these concessions, 
indicative of a shift in political attitudes and a change in economic thinking. This was the 
context in which the Uruguay Round was negotiated.
This paper examines how the concept of preferential, i.e. S&D treatment for 
developing countries, has been incorporated in multilateral, regional and bilateral trade 
agreements, and the implications for smaller developing countries such as those in the 
Caribbean. Although the WTO does not recognize smaller developing countries as a distinct 
category, these countries do have certain peculiarities that set them apart from developing 
countries in general. According to the Independent Group of Experts on Smaller
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Economies, “smaller does not necessarily imply an economic disadvantage, (but) it does 
limit the range of policy options and resources available to policy makers, and increases the 
vulnerability of the economy to external shocks” (May 1997, p. 6). This report goes on to 
say that smaller island economies are particularly vulnerable, given their geographic 
limitations, narrow resource base and limited administrative capacity. All 15 members of 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are smaller developing economies1. It is therefore 
important to review the evolution of S&D treatment for the broader category of developing 
countries in order to examine its impact on this subset of countries and also to determine 
how S&D measures ought to be improved to accommodate them.
This paper comprises five sections. The first section traces and analyzes the evolution 
of asymmetrical treatment as a defining principle of trade relations among unequal trade 
partners. Asymmetrical treatment was initially conceived as a means to attain a higher 
development stage. Over time it became embedded in multilateral trade agreements and 
constituted a discriminatory exception in favour of developing countries, exempting them 
from fulfilling the strict reciprocity principle in the implementation of the Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) clause within the GATT/WTO framework.
The second section furthers this analysis by describing more specifically the 
treatment of preferences granted to developing economies in GATT and the WTO. The 
section discusses the way in which special and differential treatment was initially 
incorporated as Part IV of the GATT agreement and later on in the Tokyo and Uruguay 
Rounds. In the Tokyo Round, it became identified with the enabling clause and in the 
Uruguay Round it was compartmentalized in a series of negotiating provisions constituting 
exemptions to the most favoured nation clause.
The third section focuses on the incorporation of special and differential treatment in 
regional and extraregional bilateral trade agreements. This section addresses the treatment 
afforded to less developing economies within CARICOM, the Lomé Convention, the CBI, 
the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP).
The fourth section centers on the implications of special and differential treatment for 
Caribbean economies with emphasis on the trade relations between these and the United 
States and Europe. The section uses trade data for 1985-1999 and two Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) software programmes, the 
Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN) and the Module to Analyse the Growth of 
International Commerce (MAGIC). The focus of the section is the relationship between the 
export structure and structural change.
On the basis for these empirical results, the last section provides a first approximation 
to the meaningful application of special and differential treatment to developing economies
1 For a succinct analysis of the characteristics of smaller economies and the implications of these characteristics 
for economic growth and adjustment to economic change, see Richard Bernal, “The Integration of Smaller 
Economies in the Free Trade Area of the Americas,” 2 February 1998, pp. 8-10.
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and, in particular, Caribbean countries. The section also includes a discussion of appropriate 
special and differential provisions applicable to the smaller economies
1. Asymmetric treatment as a defining principle of trade relations 
between unequal trading partners
Calls for preferential treatment for developing countries have their origins in 
development theories, specifically the structuralist approach to international trade. As early 
as the 1947 GATT conference in Havana, developing countries began to challenge the 
assumption that trade liberalisation on the basis on MFN principles would result in economic 
growth and development in their respective States. This assumption was based on traditional 
neo-classical trade theory, which assumes that: (a) international trade takes place among 
countries in an environment of perfect competition; and (b) trade occurs because of 
differences in comparative advantage which in turn derive from differences in resource 
endowments or technology.
While in fact “differentiated” treatment had its origin in colonial trade arrangements, 
developing countries maintained that the particular structural features of their economies, 
coupled with “distortions” based on these historical colonial-trading relationships had a 
negative impact on their trade prospects. They argued for flexibility within the GATT 
system to enable them to improve the terms of trade, diversify their economies beyond the 
exports of primary commodities and industrialize through protection of domestic industries 
and export subsidies. Over time, asymmetric or S&D treatment came to be embodied in the 
GATT itself, and came to be based on two operational principles. Developing countries were 
granted:
• Policy discretion vis a vis the right to erect trade barriers and other measures 
inconsistent with GATT obligations, in order to protect domestic industries or 
correct balance of payments problems (Gibbs, 1998 p. 2).
• Enhanced market access through: (a) the GSP; (b) non-reciprocity vis à vis the 
MFN principle in multilateral trade agreements; and (c) the creation of 
preferential trading arrangements with an exemption from Article XXIV of 
the GATT on free trade areas and customs unions.
Later on, the incorporation of Annex IV to the GATT (1964) provided for the first 
time a legal framework that could be used to address developing countries’ concerns over 
trade liberalisation and economic integration. At the same time, a Committee on Trade and 
Development was established in response to developing country demands for adequate 
treatment of economic development issues within the GATT.
In essence, S&D treatment came to constitute a discriminatory exception in favor of 
developing countries, exempting them from fulfilling the strict reciprocity principle in the 
implementation of the MFN clause within the GATT/WTO framework. On their part,
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developed countries agreed to preferential treatment out of a desire to keep the developing 
countries within the framework of multilateral trade rules (Oyeide, May 2000).
In the first few years of the GATT, developing country demands for preferences 
focused on the ability to protect the domestic market from imports. As the limits to import- 
substitution approach to development became clear, developing countries began to focus on 
export-oriented strategies, and the demand for preferences came to include access to markets 
in developed countries.
In the 1980s, developing countries took a broader approach with respect to S&D 
treatment. While seeking to preserve earlier gains with respect to preferences in the context 
of multilateral trade negotiations, they began to insist on the strict application of the MFN 
clause, obtaining MFN tariff reductions and focusing on strengthening the disciplines of the 
GATT, in areas such as dispute settlement. This was in response to the perception that S&D 
gains already achieved were being undermined by several measures being taken by 
developed countries: (a) voluntary export restraints, often directed against the most 
competitive exports of developing countries; (b) higher MFN tariffs on products of export 
interest to developing countries; (c) additional restraints on textile and clothing exports under 
the Multi-Fiber Agreement; (d) bilateral pressures on developing countries aimed at securing 
trade concessions, via the threat of trade sanctions; (e) the diminishing effectiveness of those 
GATT disciplines governing trade in agricultural products; and (f) increased pressures with 
regard to anti-dumping and countervailing duties (Oyeide, 2000 pp. 2-3).
By the early 1990s, most developing countries had adopted an export-oriented 
development model, in the context of a new international environment focusing on 
globalization and economic liberalisation. Consequently, the multilateral trade negotiations 
in the Uruguay Round were seen as a means of securing improved market access for their 
products. Accordingly, many developing countries made significant concessions in exchange 
for these preferences.
Indeed, the Uruguay Round negotiations essentially changed the concept of S&D 
treatment. Instead of addressing the issue of special rights to protect developing countries’ 
markets, the focus was on the “treatment” that these countries should be granted in order to 
become full participants in the international trading system. The 1994 Marrakesh 
Declaration that created the WTO, recognized the principle of S&D treatment as an integral 
part of the Agreement. More recently, the Doha Ministerial Declaration (9-14 November 
2001), which opens the way for a new trade round, reaffirmed the need for S&D treatment 
and stated that these provisions must be revised to make them more “precise, effective and 
operational” .
Asymmetric treatment is now a well-established concept and practice in multilateral, 
regional and bilateral trade agreements. This has usually been based on differences in levels 
of development with three categories being recognized, namely, developed, developing and 
least-developed countries. There are generally no special provisions for smaller developing 
countries within multilateral or bilateral agreements. On the other hand, regional 
arrangements, such as Lomé, include special provisions for island States, and there are
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proposals to accommodate the particular needs of smaller economies in the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations.
The principle of asymmetric treatment in trade relations between developed and 
developing countries now essentially includes two categories of measures. First, those that 
are embodied in multilateral trade agreements (GATT, WTO) and in several integration 
arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, such as the CARICOM, the CARICOM- 
Venezuela Agreement, the CARICOM-Colombia Agreement, the Central America Common 
Market (CACM) and the Andean Pact. These provisions provide protection for developing 
countries’ markets and include permanent or temporary non-reciprocity arrangements with 
respect to tariffs, the broad exemption with respect to infant industry protection and the 
exception given to developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations from the general 
prohibition of quantitative import restrictions (OAS Trade Unit, 1996 p. 2).
Second, there are those measures that provide special access to the markets in 
developed countries. The provisions are included in the various agreements that provide 
developing countries with duty-free or preferential access, such as the GSP, CBI, 
CARIBCAN and the Lomé Convention. These measures are non-reciprocal, generally 
granted unilaterally and are of limited duration, subject to renewal.
2. The treatment of preferences provided to developing countries 
in multilateral trade agreements
Differentiated treatment became universally recognized when the GATT was formed 
and evolved within the multilateral trading system in response to pressures from developing 
countries. These pressures were successful because of the growing representation of 
developing countries within the GATT, and their predominance in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as well as the increasing importance of 
developing country exports as a percentage of world trade. The rationale for developing 
country demands for preferential treatment in the GATT was that the MFN principle was not 
appropriate for trade involving unequal partners. Furthermore, it was thought that 
preferences were needed so that developing countries could compete effectively in world 
markets (OAS Trade Unit, 1996, p. 1).
Although the initial premise underlying GATT in 1947 was parity of obligations 
between all trading nations, the concept of permitting differentiated treatment existed from 
the outset. This took the form of preferential treatment to developing countries, meaning 
preferential access to developed country markets through tariff preferences, and exemptions 
from GATT rules. These provisions were actually incorporated after the GATT agreement 
was signed. In 1965, the special status of developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system was established with the adoption of a new Part IV of the GATT, which embodied 
what was termed “special and differential treatment.” This was essentially defined as non­
reciprocity for developing countries.
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Box 1: Main provisions of the GATT Agreement - Part IV
1. Principles and objectives
• Expansion of export earnings of developing countries
• Ensuring that less developed countries secure a share in the growth of international 
trade commensurate with their economic development needs
• Improved market access conditions both for exports of developing countries
• Increased collaboration with the financial institutions and UN organizations
• Joint action by Members in the pursuit of these objectives
• Non-reciprocity for GATT commitments on tariff reduction or elimination of tariffs 
________ and other trade barriers_________________________________________________
2. Commitments
• Developed countries will give priority “to the fullest extent possible” to the 
reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to products of export interest to developing 
countries
• Developed countries should exercise restraint in introducing or increasing tariff or 
non-tariff barriers on these products
• Developed countries should exercise restraint on imposing new fiscal measures on 
primary product exports of developing countries
Source: WTO -  www.wto.org
In the first few decades of the GATT, developing countries were granted significant 
exemptions from GATT disciplines to facilitate import-substitution strategies and protection 
of infant industries, the development approach that was advocated at that time. However, 
these concessions did not represent a significant departure from the basic trading principle of 
the GATT, namely that tariff concessions should be granted on a MFN basis. Eventually, 
countries were granted either preferential tariffs or complete removal of tariffs on a non­
binding basis, particularly on raw material exports. However, trade barriers or quantitative 
restrictions were maintained on those products that could form the basis of an export-led 
growth strategy e.g., textiles and processed agricultural products. One view is that this 
treatment of developing countries in the global trade regime was an obstacle to export-led 
growth (Trebilcock and House, 1995 p. 302).
Until the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations in 1979, exceptions to the MFN 
principle were considered to be deviations from the norm. However, during these 
negotiations, consistent lobbying by the developing countries resulted in the adoption of the
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“Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries” or the so-called Enabling Clause, which provided a 
legal basis for preferential treatment, in spite of the MFN principle (OAS Trade Unit, 1996, 
p.1). While the Tokyo Round resulted in enhanced disciplines with respect to subsidies, 
technical barriers to trade and customs valuation, these were not accepted by most 
developing countries (Gibbs, 1998 p. 2). Furthermore, the Agreement also made clear that 
S&D treatment was granted on a temporary basis, rather than instituted as a permanent right.
In the Uruguay Round, there was a shift in approach to S&D treatment, from 
enhanced market access opportunities to the granting of transition periods and technical 
assistance (WTO, 2001 p.2). This shift also coincided with a change in trade strategies on the 
part of developing countries. The import-substitution strategies of the previous decades were 
perceived as failures and trade liberalisation was now viewed by developing countries as the 
way to increase growth and welfare.
During the Uruguay Round, Concessions were given to developing countries, not as 
substantive exemptions from specific GATT principles, as in previous trade rounds, but via 
specific negotiated provisions. In addition, special treatment was negotiated separately, 
within each negotiating group, rather than as a framework to the overall agreement. These 
provisions gave “time-limited derogations” i.e, longer transition periods for implementing 
GATT obligations, greater flexibility in undertaking commitments and implementing 
agreements, “best endeavor” clauses and non-mandatory offers of technical assistance to help 
developing countries fulfil specific obligations (Oyejide, 2000, p.7). Essentially, many of 
the S&D provisions are, therefore, non-binding and not legally enforceable. Furthermore, the 
time limits for implementing GATT obligations will be phased out in the context of the WTO 
by 2005 so, in essence, the Uruguay Round has significantly eroded the preferential 
arrangements of previous agreements. Indeed, S & D treatment is only linked to economic 
criteria in the area of subsidies and countervailing measures, where countries with less than 
US$1,000 per capita are exempt from the prohibition of export subsidies. In exchange for 
these measures, some developing countries made important concessions in terms of market 
access (Oyejide, 2000, p.3).
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Box 2: Selected aspects of special and differential treatment in the Uruguay Round
1. Time extensions and exemptions
a. Agreement on Agriculture
Developing economies are given a 10-year period for the implementation of tariff reduction 
commitments and developed countries a 6-year period.
b. Technical barriers to trade
Developing countries are granted limited exceptions for the fulfilment of their obligations.
c. Trade related investment measures (TRIMs)
Developed and developing countries are given 2 and 5-year periods respectively to eliminate 
TRIMs, which were not in conformity with the agreement.
d. Customs valuation
Developing countries are granted a 5-year extension period for implementation.
e. Subsidies and countervailing measures
Following the entry into force of the agreement, developing countries can continue to apply 
export subsidies for 8 years. They can also continue to apply explicitly forbidden subsidies 
for 5 years. The prohibition of subsidies does not apply to those countries whose GNP is less 
than US$1, 000 per capita.
f. Safeguards
Developed and developing countries can continue to apply safeguard measures for 8 and 10 
years respectively.
g. Trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS)
Developing countries are given a time extension of 4 years for its implementation.
h. Import licensing procedures
Developing countries are granted a 2-year period for the implementation of the agreement.
2. Preferential disciplines
a. Agriculture
Tariff reduction for all agricultural products for developed and developing countries is set at 
36% and 24% respectively. The total reduction in the Aggregate Measurement of Support 
(AMS) is established at 20% for developed countries and at 13% for developing countries. 
The cuts in the value of subsidies is set at 24% for developing countries and at 36% for 
developed countries. Developing countries are allowed to maintain restrictions on the 
imports of basic products.
b. Subsidies and countervailing measures
More generous provisions for countervailing measure investigations in developing countries.
3. Flexibility in the fulfilment of the agreements
a. Agriculture
Exemptions from domestic support reduction commitments are applicable to measures 
oriented to encourage agricultural and rural development. Developing countries are exempted 
from the export prohibitions contained in Article 11 of the GATT.
b. Dispute settlement
Developing countries have the right to include a developing country as a panel member. Time 
extensions are granted for developing countries during the different phases of the dispute 




a. Developed countries must take into account the interests of developing countries in the 
implementation of market access and antidumping decisions.
b. Establishment of procedures to preserve the availability of foodstuffs in countries that are net 
importers of these products.
c. Developed countries must provide incentives to less developed countries for the transfer of 
technology.
5. Services
a. Within 2 years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, developed countries 
should establish contact points to facilitate the access of developing country members’ 
service suppliers to information, related to their respective markets concerning: i) commercial 
and technical aspects of the supply of services; ii) registration, recognition and obtaining of 
professional qualifications and iii) the availability of services technology.
b. Particular pressures on the balance of payments of a member in the process of economic 
development may necessitate the use of import restrictions.
c. The interests of developing countries should be taken into account in subsidy negotiations.
d. Increasing participation of developing countries should be facilitated through negotiated 
specific commitments relating to: i) the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and 
its efficiency and competitiveness; ii) improvement of their access to distribution channels 
and information networks; iii) liberalisation of market access in sectors and modes of supply 
of export interest to developing countries.
Source: Based on Whalley (1999) and on the final documents of the Uruguay Round.
In the Uruguay Round of negotiations on investment it was agreed, at the insistence 
of the developing countries, that only trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) would be 
negotiated in the negotiations on goods, while trade in services would be on a separate track. 
Developing countries insisted that discussions be limited to investment measures that had a 
“direct and significant” impact on trade. The idea was to maintain maximum flexibility in 
applying investment policies such as technology transfer requirements, local equity 
requirements and incentives to achieve economic growth. They argued that TRIMs were 
necessary to offset anti-competitive practices of multinational corporations. As a result, 
developing countries won limited concessions. The TRIMs agreement permits developing 
countries to maintain TRIMs to 2002 (in the case of the Least Developed), and includes the 
possibility of extensions in individual cases (Gibbs and Mashayekhi, 1998 p.7).
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While the WTO Agreement2 does not recognize smaller economies as a separate 
category, it explicitly recognizes that they are different types of economies and that these 
economies require rules and disciplines, which are specifically designed to take account of 
their needs. The preamble of the WTO Agreement recognizes that there is need for positive 
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, “secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of the economic development.” 
Furthermore, the “Enabling Clause” of the GATT, which was carried over into the WTO 
permits, but does not require, WTO members to provide S&D treatment in favor of 
developing countries. This basically consists of: (a) the granting of more extensive time 
limits for the adoption of general rules; (b) “best endeavor clauses”; (c) the establishment of 
some exceptions for smaller countries and the less developed states; and (d) the provision of 
technical assistance (SELA, 1997 p.1).
During the recent WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Doha in November 2001, 
developing countries were opposed to the launch of a new trade round being advocated by 
the developed countries. This was based on the fact that many issues and concerns regarding 
the implementation of several WTO agreements (on intellectual property, technical barriers 
to trade, agriculture, etc.) had not been resolved. In addition, the difficulties and resource 
constraints they encountered in the implementation of many WTO obligations had not been 
addressed.
The African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries, in particular, continued to lobby for 
recognition of the needs and concerns of smaller developing economies. These countries 
expressed the view that a specific work programme on smaller economies should be adopted, 
and that S&D treatment should be institutionalized within the WTO, and obligations in this 
regard are made legally binding. Indeed, a meeting of the WTO General Council in Geneva 
in October had proposed “substantial and differential treatment for developing countries”, 
stating that this should be a “broad and integral part of all elements” of any future trade talks 
(Patterson, 2001). Accordingly, the Doha Ministerial Declaration stressed that the needs and 
interests of developing countries should be a central part of the future work of the WTO. 
While there was agreement on a work programme for smaller developing economies under 
the auspices of the General Council, there was however an implicit recognition that any 
responses to the trade-related issues identified as a result of this work should not lead to a 
new “smaller developing country” classification within the WTO. A work programme for 
S&D treatment was also endorsed, essentially a review of existing provisions in order to 
make them more effective. Finally, of special interest to CARICOM countries, waivers were 
granted for the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and the European Commission (EC) 
Transitional Regime for bananas until 31 December 2007 and 31 December 2005, 
respectively.
2 The Agreement includes GATT 1994, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
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3. The treatment of preferences provided to smaller developing countries 
within regional and bilateral agreements
According to one analysis, the debt crisis of 1982 served as a catalyst for a major shift 
in development strategies in developing countries, including those in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). These strategies have focused on trade reform and trade liberalisation, 
both unilaterally and also within the context of integration agreements, in contrast to the 
integration undertakings of the 1960 and 1970s (Devlin and Garay, 1996 p.7 & pp. 10-11). 
Given the vast differences in levels of development in the LAC region, regional and bilateral 
agreements have tended to incorporate specific provisions for the “least developed”, or 
“disadvantaged” economies. Special and differential treatment has either been: (a) 
“institutionalized” within agreements, giving permanent preferences and easier terms for 
compliance with obligations (CARICOM and the Andean Community); or (b) limited to 
temporary measures such as extended periods for complying with trade liberalisation 
obligations (MERCOSUR). In some instances, for example the CACM, there are no special 
and differential provisions. This is increasingly the case with the “new style” free trade 
agreements being negotiated in the LAC region.
3.1. CARICOM
CARICOM itself grants special and differential treatment to the lesser-developed 
countries within the Community. Furthermore, CARICOM has signed two bilateral 
agreements with Venezuela and Colombia, which contain preferential trade provisions. Both 
agreements provide temporary non-reciprocal trade benefits to CARICOM States. In 1998, 
CARICOM also negotiated an agreement with the Dominican Republic for a free trade area. 
These agreements are part of a growing trend towards trade liberalisation in the region.3 They 
represent concrete expressions of “South-South” cooperation and are being granted from one 
developing country to a group of “Lesser Developed” countries in order to strengthen 
economic and trade linkages.
S&D treatment is embodied in the CARICOM Treaty with a distinction being made 
at the outset between the More Developed Countries (MDCs) (Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname) and the Less Developed Countries (LDCS) of 
the Eastern Caribbean and Haiti (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001). Preferential treatment is 
extended to the LDCs through a Special Regime for Less Developed Countries. This implies 
a recognition of the different levels of development between both groups of countries, which 
will result in differences in the ability to comply with the various provisions of the 
Agreement, as well as the ability to take advantage of the benefits of the Treaty and, 
therefore, a determination to minimize the possible skewing of benefits in favor of the 
MDCs. The Special Regime (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001, p. 98) focuses on trading 
arrangements, fiscal measures, the facilitation of financial flows, technical assistance and use 
of technological and research facilities in the MDCs.
3 For an extensive examination of this phenomenon, see, Toward Free Trade in the Americas, Jose Manuel 
Salazar-Xirinachs and Maryse Robert eds. OAS and Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
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Box 3: Specific features of the CARICOM Special Regime
1. Original Treaty of Chaguaramas (1973) -  LDCs are allowed to continue to impose import 
duties or fiscal charges on an agreed list of goods imported from Member States, whether 
or not these goods were eligible for Common Market Treatment. Revised Treaty (2001) 
-  LDCs can apply to the CARICOM Council on Trade and Economic Development 
(COTED) in order to impose import duties in cases of loss in revenues from importing 
goods eligible for Community treatment. (Article 160)
2. The special needs of LDCs are to be taken into account with respect to Article 30, in 
which Member States are required to remove restrictions on the right of establishment, 
the right to provide services and the right to move capital in the Community.
3. The special needs of LDCs are to be considered with respect to: the establishment of the 
Common External Tariff (Article 163); the Process List regarding qualifying criteria for 
regionally-produced goods; and the Scheme for the Harmonization of Fiscal Incentives to 
Industry.
4. The LDCs are allowed, on application to COTED, as a temporary measure, to suspend 
Common Market Tariff treatment of eligible goods from the MDCs, on grounds of 
domestic production. (Article 164)
5. LDCs are exempt from the provision on Public Undertakings i.e. they are allowed to 
protect domestic industry by imposing duties or quantitative restrictions on goods of 
Community origin (Article 165)
6. MDCs should cooperate in promoting the flow of investment capital to the LDCs 
through: private investment capital or joint ventures; double taxation agreements; loan 
capital to LDCs; and the establishment of an investment institution.
7. MDCs should make their technological and research facilities available to LDCs.
8. Technical and financial assistance is to be extended to disadvantaged countries (LDCs), 
regions and sectors to allow them to participate meaningfully in the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy and to administer trade agreements in general via a Development 
Fund to be established. (Article 157)
9. Special arrangements for Belize which: allow the country to enter arrangements with 
third countries or other economic groupings as long as CARICOM States are accorded no 
less favorable treatment; allow the application of quantitative export restrictions on live 
animals of the bovine species and meat of bovine animals; permit the suspension of 
Common Market treatment on imports competitive with the products of its tire recapping 
and steel products industries.
Sources: OAS Trade Unit, 1996 p. 27; CARICOM, 2001.
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3.2. CARICOM  -Venezuela Agreement
The trade component of the Agreement includes the provision of one-way duty free 
access to the Venezuelan market for goods originating in CARICOM States. Access is 
granted through tariff reduction and the elimination of non-tariff barriers.
Box 4: Main trade provisions of the CARICOM-Venezuela Agreement (1992)
1. CARICOM
CARICOM’s export products are either given immediate duty-free treatment or there is a phased 
reduction of duties as follows:
• Beginning January 1, 1993, 75 % of the MFN rate of duty will apply
• Beginning January 1, 1994, 50% of the MFN duty will apply
• As of January 1, 1995, 25% of the MFN duty will apply;
• As of January 1, 1996, duty-free treatment will apply
2. Venezuela
CARICOM States will grant MFN treatment to all imports from Venezuela and agree not to 
“without prior consultation with Venezuela, apply any quantitative restrictions to imports from 
Venezuela, beyond those currently in place or those authorized under the CARICOM Treaty”.
3. Other provisions
Provisions are also made for:
a) the application of safeguards and the settlement of disputes;
b) the establishment of regional joint ventures between the Parties; and
c) the promotion and protection of investment, through bilateral investment treaties and double 
taxation agreements with individual CARICOM states.
A call for an evaluation process by the CARICOM-Venezuela Joint Council on Trade and 
Investment within four years after the Agreement is ratified, in order to possibly introduce 
provisions for reciprocity.
Source: CARICOM 1992, Articles 4 and 6.
3.3 CARICOM  -  Colombia Agreement
This Agreement also seeks to promote trade as well as mutual economic and technical 
cooperation. As in the accord with Venezuela, provisions are made for the negotiation of 
bilateral investment treaties with CARICOM States and investment promotion activities. 
Also, in similar fashion, to facilitate convergence with the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI), this Agreement remains open to those member countries. Technical 
cooperation activities in the Colombia Agreement, however, include additional areas such as
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science and technology and environmental management. The Agreement also remains in 
force indefinitely (CARICOM, 1994 Article 27).
Box 5: Trade provisions of CARICOM-Colombia Agreement (1994)
1. CARICOM
The promotion and expansion of trade places particular emphasis on exports from CARICOM in 
the early stages of the agreement.
Colombia grants preferential treatment to products from CARICOM States through the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers and the elimination of tariffs on three groups of products as 
listed in the Annexes to the Agreement.
Duties on these products are either eliminated when the Agreement comes into force on June 1, 
1998, or eliminated in three equal annual reductions as of that time.
A third list of products are granted M FN treatment initially and possible preferential treatment in 
2002, based on negotiations between CARICOM and Colombia.
2. Colombia
For products from Colombia entering CARICOM, MFN treatment will apply initially, with the 
reduction and elimination of tariffs on an agreed list of products beginning on January 1, 1999.
With respect to this clause however, a distinction is made between LDCs and MDCs within 
CARICOM. LDCs are not required to grant these tariff concessions.
Source: CARICOM 1994, Articles 5 & 6
3.4. CARICOM -Dominican Republic Agreement
The free trade agreement between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic is a much 
more comprehensive agreement than the Venezuela and Colombia accords and covers many 
of the issue areas to be negotiated in the FTAA, such as intellectual property rights and 
government procurement. It includes provisions on trade in goods and services, investment 
and economic cooperation. A distinction is made at the outset between MDCs and LDCs 
within CARICOM and specific goals of the Agreement are as follows:
1. The establishment of a Free Trade Area which is WTO consistent;
2. The promotion and expansion of trade in goods through free market access,
elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade, and the establishment of a system of 
rules of origin, customs cooperation and the harmonization of technical, 
sanitary, and phyto-sanitary procedures;
3. The progressive liberalisation of trade in services;
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4. Free movement of capital, and the promotion and protection of investments;
5. Promotion of private sector activities, including the promotion and
establishment of joint ventures;
6. Cooperation in all the major economic sectors, such as agriculture, mining,
tourism, transportation, telecommunications, banking, science and technology;
7. The discouragement of anti-competitive business practices (CARICOM, 1998 
Article II).
Box 6: Trade provisions of CARICOM-Dominican Republic Agreement (1998)
1. CARICOM
Reciprocity in trade in goods, but the LDCs in CARICOM are exempt from this requirement. 
CARICOM products from all CARICOM territories are entitled to duty-free access into the 
Dominican Republic, except for a prescribed list as outlined in the Appendices II and III of the 
Agreement on Trade in Goods. These products will either receive a phased reduction in tariffs or 
the application of the MFN duty.
2. Dominican Republic
The same conditions apply for goods from the Dominican Republic entering CARICOM markets. 
However, the LDCs in CARICOM are not required to extend duty-free treatment on products 
from the Dominican Republic.
LDCs in CARICOM are allowed to apply the MFN rate of duty until 2005.
3. Services
The principle of reciprocity also extends to trade in services.
In the Agreement on Trade in Services, the Parties agree to immediately and unconditionally 
apply MFN treatment.
This does not prevent either party from “conferring or according advantages to adjacent countries 
to facilitate exchanges of services that are locally produced and consumed”.
Sources: CARICOM 1998, Annexes I & II.
CARIBCAN, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the CBI and 
its successor agreement, the CBTPA of 2000, the Lomé Convention and, to a lesser extent, 
the Cotonou Agreement, generally provide one-way preferential access to the markets of 
Canada, the United States and the European Union (EU), respectively. These agreements
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establish strict rules of origin to ensure that benefits only accrue to producers in the 
beneficiary countries.
3.5 CARIBCAN
The main component of the programme, which began in 1986, includes duty-free 
treatment for CARICOM countries and dependent territories, such as the British Virgin 
Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands. To qualify for 
duty-free treatment, at least 60 per cent of the ex-factory price of the goods must originate in 
one or more beneficiary countries or Canada. The following products were originally 
exempted from the programme:
• Textiles and apparel
• Certain leather goods (i.e. leather-covered trunks or cases for goods, except 
for leather luggage)
• Petroleum oils in retail packages
• Methanol
• Lubricating oils, partly based on petroleum
• Articles of apparel and clothing accessories of leather etc. (OAS Trade Unit, 
1996 p. 54)
However, the list of preferences has expanded over the years to include all imports 
from the Caribbean except, textiles, clothing and footwear, as well as goods subject to MFN 
duties of above 35 per cent. In 1999, over Cdn$400 million out of the Cdn$550 million worth 
of goods imported by Canada from CARIBCAN countries received duty-free treatment on a 
MFN basis. The Caribbean products that are benefiting from the scheme include cane sugar, 
fish, spirits and certain agricultural products (Salazar-Xirinachs and Robert, 2001 p. 115).
There are no conditionality provisions in the Agreement except in relation to standard 
requirements regarding documentation, direct shipment and rules of origin provisions. In 
addition, Canada reserves the right to withdraw duty-free privileges from any of the 
beneficiary countries. Benefits under CARIBCAN have qualified for a waiver from Article 
of the GATT that would require Canada to extend similar duty-free treatment to any other 
country. The WTO Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the GATT 
revised the expiry date for the waiver (OAS Trade Unit, 1996).
3.6 The Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
Duty-free access for developing countries in the Central American and Caribbean 
region was initially provided under the United States GSP programme enacted in 1974, and 
was based on the wider GSP initiative negotiated in UNCTAD. As originally conceived, 
however, only 60 per cent of the products in United States tariff schedules were included. A 
wide range of products, some of which are important Caribbean exports, were excluded, such 
as citrus, tobacco, apparel and textiles and petroleum products. The programme is subject to
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annual reviews and benefits can be reduced or withdrawn if the country in question fails to 
provide “reasonable access to its markets” or fails to provide “adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights” . There is also a provision for the “graduation” of 
developing countries from GSP status at a certain level of per capita, (for example, US$8,500 
in the amended GSP programme in 1984) (Trebilcock and House, 1995 p. 309). Finally, 
products can be removed from the GSP list if  a country’s exports of these products exceed 
“competitive need” limits.
In addition to GSP, the CBI, a preferential access programme, was established in 
1983, specifically for the countries of the Caribbean Basin, many of which are smaller States. 
Under the 10-year programme, the President was authorized to grant duty-free treatment for 
eligible products from 24 Central American and Caribbean countries. Duty-free and reduced 
duty entry was granted on a non-reciprocal, preferential basis with notable product 
exclusions.4 Rules of origin required that textile products had to be directly imported from a 
CBI country, with at least 35 per cent value-added. If a product included foreign 
components, then it should have undergone substantial transformation. In addition, a Special 
Access Programme (SAP) provided quota free entry or higher quota entry into the United 
States for qualifying textile and apparel products for six countries under guaranteed access 
levels (GALS) (IDB, 2000, pp. 55-56)5. Preferences did not eliminate quantitative 
restrictions on CBI agricultural products entering the United States.
Unlike CARIBCAN, preferences were contingent on the fulfilment of certain 
requirements in beneficiary countries, namely, adherence to internationally recognized 
worker rights and to provide effective protection of intellectual property rights. 
Furthermore, as in the GSP programme, the President could suspend or limit a country’s 
benefits at any time.
The CBI programme was enhanced through the CBERA in 1990. Benefits were 
made indefinite, and rules of origin now allowed for regional accumulation, and tariff 
reductions or tariff-free treatment was extended to some products that were previously 
exempt. By 1992, tariffs were further reduced or eliminated on an additional 122 tariff 
categories. Indeed, by 1999, 13.6 per cent of total United States imports from CBI countries, 
representing about 6,900 individual products, were covered by preferential treatment under 
CBI (IDB, 2000).
New CBI legislation was passed in May 2000 in an attempt to maintain preferences 
that were undermined by benefits to Mexico under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). The CBTPA, Title II of the Trade and Development Act of 2000, 
eliminates many of the remaining CBI exemptions, but imposes extensive new requirements 
for country eligibility. These include: (a) fulfilment of WTO obligations; (b) participation in
4 Products excluded were: textiles and apparel, leather goods, canned tuna, petroleum and petroleum products, 
certain footwear, certain watches and parts, and certain agricultural goods. Although textiles and apparel were 
excluded, special duty concessions still applied under the 807 provisions. Under this programme, imports into 
the United States assembled in CBI countries from United States fabric, cut to shape in the United States, were 
only subject to duties on the non- United States value-added component.
5 In this regard, bilateral agreements were signed with the six apparel-producing CBI countries: Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica and Panama.
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negotiations for the FTAA; (c) protection of intellectual property consistent with, or greater 
than, Uruguay Round standards; (d) implementation of internationally recognized labor 
rights; (d) positive certification in counter-narcotics efforts according to criteria in the United 
States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; (e) a commitment to eliminating child labor as 
defined in the United States GSP law; (f) adoption of the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption; and (g) transparency in government procurement as outlined in the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (IDB, 2000 p. 25). As is clear, this is therefore a 
highly conditional programme.
Enhancements to CBI include:
• Tariff treatment similar to NAFTA for products previously excluded from the 
old Agreement, such as canned tuna, footwear, handbags, luggage and leather 
wearing apparel, watches and watch parts, petroleum and petroleum products;
• Duty free and quota free treatment for apparel formed and cut in the United 
States and assembled in CBI countries from American yarns and fabrics;
• Duty free and quota treatment for apparel articles knit to shape or cut and 
assembled in a CBI country from United States yarns (other than outwear T 
shirts and socks), with an initial annual limit of 250 million square meter 
equivalents. Outwear T shirts will be subject to an initial annual limit of 4.2 
million dozen. Both quotas will increase 16 per cent annually in the 
subsequent three years;
• Preferential treatment for rum beverages (90 per cent rum content) processed 
in Canada from rum originating in a CBI country, where the rum is imported 
directly into Canada and the beverages are sent directly from Canada to the 
United States.
Agricultural products important to the Caribbean, such as sugar, rice and tobacco, continue to 
be subject to high tariff rate quotas.
Table 1
Quota distribution of the 250 million square meters of knit apparel
Country (Country Grouping) Quantity (squared meters)
CARICOM 12 312 500
Costa Rica 18 690 250
Nicaragua 4 925 000
El Salvador 53 496 000
Guatemala 48 496 250
Honduras 62 995 250
Dominican Republic 45 334 750
Panama 3 750 000
Total 250 000 000
Source: Agency for the Promotion of International Trade of Costa Rica (2001)
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Table 2
Quota distribution of the 4.2 million dozen outwear T-shirts
Country (Country Grouping) Quantity (squared meters)
CARICOM 210 000
Costa Rica 63 000
Nicaragua 168 000
El Salvador 872 655
Guatemala 471 345
Honduras 1 764 000
Dominican Republic 609 000
Panama 42 000
Total 4 200 000
Source: Agency for the Promotion of International Trade of Costa Rica ( 2001)
Benefits under the programme expire in September 2008, or on the date when the 
FTAA enters into force. In spite of the high level of conditionality attached to CBTPA, some 
see it as a short-term opportunity to promote labor-intensive export activities, particularly in 
the textile and apparel sector. These potential benefits will be undermined as early as 2005 
however, when the Multi-fiber Agreement expires on 1 January of that year, resulting in 
increased competition in the United States market from Asian producers, and the possible 
beginning of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (IDB, 2000, p.1).
3.7 The Lomé Convention
The Lomé Convention is a comprehensive framework providing for ACP-EU 
cooperation in poverty reduction and sustainable development. The idea is to facilitate the 
progressive integration of the ACP countries into the world economy. Under Lomé, the 
products of the ACP States are granted duty-free access into the EU. This is important, as 
according to the Commonwealth Secretariat’s Vulnerability Index, 29 of the most vulnerable 
31 developing countries are smaller States and 27 of them are in the ACP group (Sutton, 
2000). Virtually all manufactured goods and many agricultural products qualify for 
preferential treatment.
The first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975 (with 45 ACP countries) following 
the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community. There followed Lomé II 
in 1975 (with 58 ACP countries), Lomé III in 1984 (with 65 ACP countries), and Lomé IV in 
1989 (with 68 countries in 1989 and 70 in 1995). Under Lomé IV, all CARICOM exports 
enter the EU duty free and the agreement also provides for special regimes for bananas, rum, 
beef and sugar. The Cotonou Agreement (Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000) replaces Lomé IV 
and is valid for a period of 20 years, with periodic revisions every five years. The Cotonou 
Agreement fundamentally changes trade relations between the European Community and
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ACP States. Contrary to the “spirit” of Lomé, it was decided that trade relations rather than 
being based on non-reciprocal trade preferences should be founded upon the progressive 
dismantling of trade barriers and preferences integrating ACP countries into the multilateral 
system and making the European Union-ACP trade relation WTO compatible.
As originally established in 1975, ACP agricultural exports falling under the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), such as dairy products, poultry meat, certain cereals and 
rice, were entitled to preferential treatment, although not unlimited access. They enjoyed 
substantial reductions in import levies within a tariff quota.6 Furthermore, special highly 
preferential protocols were formulated to apply to fixed quantities of exports of rum, sugar, 
bananas, beef and veal. In addition, the Lomé Agreement included two special financing 
facilities — STABEX, to stabilize export earnings of ACP countries in agricultural products, 
and SYSMIN to support the mining sector.
STABEX provided protection for the following products: groundnuts, cocoa, coffee, 
coconut products, cotton, palm nut and palm kernel products, raw hides, skins, leather, wood 
products, tea and sisal. In each case, the programme would apply only if earnings from the 
products represented at least 7.5 per cent of a country’s total earnings from merchandise 
exports. For the least developed, landlocked and island States, there was an additional 
concession. The percentage only had to be 2 per cent (ACP-EEC, 1975, Article 17). In order 
to implement the stabilization system, a reference level was calculated for each ACP State 
and for each product. The level corresponded to the product’s share of export earnings 
during the four years before export earnings fell. ACP States could apply for a financial 
transfer under STABEX if actual earnings for the particular product were at least 7 per cent 
below the reference level. For the least developed, landlocked and island States, the required 
percentage was only 2.5 per cent (ACP-EEC, 1975, Article 19). Countries did not qualify for 
the programme if the decline in export earnings was due to trade policy measures.
Compensatory mechanisms for declines in export earnings continued through Lomé 
IV. In the case of STABEX, an individual product now qualified if it comprised at least 5 
per cent of total merchandise exports. In the case of the least developed and island States, 
the percentage was as low as 1 per cent. The reference level was now calculated on the basis 
of the average export earnings over six years, rather than four (Lomé IV Agreement, 1989, 
Articles 196 and 197). In the case of SYSMIN, countries qualified in instances where during 
at least two of the four years preceding a request for aid, at least 15 per cent of their earnings 
were derived from: copper, phosphates, manganese, bauxite and alumina, tin, iron ore; or 20 
per cent of export earnings were derived from all mining products. In the case of the least 
developed, landlocked or island States, the figures were 10 per cent and 12 per cent, 
respectively (Lomé IV Agreement, 1989, Article 215).
While the Lomé Convention is non-reciprocal, ACP States cannot discriminate 
among EU member States. In other words, any benefits relating to tariffs or non-tariff 
barriers granted by a member State of the EU to an ACP State must be granted to similar 
imports from the other EU member States (OAS, 1996 p. 58).
6 A number of fruits and vegetables enjoy duty-free treatment (e.g. grapefruit, melons and papayas), whereas 
others are limited by seasonal restrictions (e.g. tomatoes, garlic, peaches, cherries)
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Lomé has been subject to periodic renewals. The new Cotonou Agreement, signed 
with the European Union on 23 June 2000, sets up a new framework for cooperation on trade 
and economic issues.
With respect to trade, the ultimate aim is to conclude new WTO-compatible trading 
arrangements, by progressively removing trade barriers between the Parties. Cotonou 
stipulates that the EU will continue to grant non-reciprocal preferential treatment for ACP 
products, only for a preparatory period based on the product lists of Lomé IV. Furthermore, 
the preferences in the special protocols for key Caribbean exports - sugar, rum, rice and 
bananas - are already being dismantled.
In the case of rum, the EU and the United States have come to an agreement to 
eliminate duties on rum by 2003. Caribbean producers have therefore expressed concern 
about their ability to compete in a fully liberalized market without the EU subsidy (IDB,
2000). As a result of lobbying, through the West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers’ 
Association, the EU has agreed to a programme of assistance to the Caribbean and other ACP 
countries, within the context of the Cotonou Agreement, which continues to guarantee duty­
free access and provides financial assistance to improve the competitiveness of the industry.
With respect to bananas, the United States and several Latin American countries 
successfully challenged the EU regime under Lomé IV in the WTO. In November 1999, the 
EU unveiled a new regime that would gradually phase out the existing tariff-quota system 
and replace it with a tariff-only regime by 1 January 2006. In July 2000, after continued 
resistance to this new proposal, the EU proposed that tariff quotas would be allocated on a 
“first come, first served basis”, with a tariff preference for ACP countries. In 2001, the EU 
reached final agreement with the United States on the tariff-only regime, with a transition 
period in which import licenses will be allocated on the basis of historical trade. This new 
arrangement began on 1 July 2001. The EU has also offered financial assistance available to 




In 1997, Ecuador Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and United States challenged the European 
Community regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas established in 1993. This 
regime consisted of the establishment of a tariff quota of 2 million tons allocated to Latin 
American countries and non-traditional ACP bananas. The tariff quota increased to 2.1 and 2.2 
million in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Also an additional tariff quota of 353,000 tons was 
introduced in the same year. The increase in the tariff quota was justified on the grounds of the 
enlargement of the European Community. The quantities allocated to traditional ACP banana 
exporters totalled 857, 700 tons. The tariff applied to Latin American producers within the quota 
was 75 ECUs per ton and a zero duty for ACP countries. This regime was found to be illegal by 
the WTO dispute settlement body. In 1999, the European Union implemented a new regime that 
was still found to be WTO incompatible. The United States and Ecuador were granted the right 
by the dispute settlement body to suspend tariff concessions to the European Union. A solution 
was finally reached in 2001. The Agreement consisted of the adoption of a tariff-only regime by 
the European Union to be implemented no later than January 1, 2006. In the interim, the regime 
to be applied consists of a two-phased scheme. The first phase consists of a modified import 
regime based on the historical allocation of licenses and entered into force in July 2001. It 
consists of three tariff rate quotas, A, B, and C. Quota A, is set at 2, 200, 000 tons. Quota B is set 
at 353, 000 tons. Quotas A and B are open for imports originating in all third countries. Quota C 
(850, 000 tons) is open to imports originating in ACP countries. In the second phase, which starts 
in January 2002, 100, 000 tons are to be transferred from C quota to the B quota. The remaining 
750, 000 tons will be still reserved for ACP bananas. At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in 
Doha, WTO waivers were granted regarding obligations under Article I (permitting continued 
tariff preferences for ACP imports) and Article XIII of the GATT (permitting the setting aside of 
the C quota for ACP bananas).
Source: European Community (2000). European Community Council Regulations No.2587/2001 (19 




Comparison of the quota/tariff structure under the previous and 
current banana import regime
Quota (tons) Remarks Tariff rate Remarks





2, 000, 000 Increased to 2.1 










quota of 353 000 
tones.
75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 






857, 700 75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 




Modification of the 1993 import regime in 2001
Quota A. Quota 
A is open for 
imports of 
products 
originating in all 
third countries






three tiered quota 
system (Quotas 
A, B and C)
75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 




Quota B is open 
for imports of 
products 
originating in all 
third countries
453, 000 75 ECU per ton 
for Latin 
American 




Quota C is open 




750, 000 0 for ACP 
countries
Sources: Official Journal of the European Communities. Council Regulations (EC), No. 2587/2001 
(December, 19, 2001); No. 896/2001 (May, 7, 2001); No.216/2001 (January, 19, 2001)
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Cotonou maintains preferential access for a limited quota of rice from ACP countries. 
However, the proposed reform to this regime will include the application of a fixed rate of 
duty on imports of husked Indica rice, and this will have an adverse effect of rice exports 
from Guyana and Suriname. Furthermore the provision on rice in the EU’s EBA Decision 
stipulates that the Least Developed Countries will receive an annual duty-free quota 
beginning in October 2001, and that this will be increased by 15 per cent annually until 2009. 
The EU has also made financial and technical assistance available to assist ACP countries 
adversely affected by these developments (Caribbean Trade and Adjustment Group, 2001).
In terms of sugar, prices received by ACP States under this regime have averaged 
more that twice the world price. For example, the average price paid for sugar imported from 
ACP States into the EU in 2000 was US .22 cents per pound, compared to a world market 
price of US .9 cents (Caribbean Trade and Adjustment Group, 2001). In keeping with a trend 
towards dismantling preferences for all but the Least Developed countries, the EU price 
regime will be brought in line with world prices.
The preparatory phase for the new trading arrangements under the Cotonou 
Agreement is eight years from the entry into force of the Agreement’s trade provisions 
(1 March 2000). Formal negotiations for these new trading arrangements will begin in 
September 2002, and the new agreement will enter into force by 1 January 2008. A 
transition period of 12-15 years towards full reciprocal trade is expected to begin at that time. 
The new trading arrangements will possibly be in the form of a series of Economic 
Partnership Agreements, including reciprocal free trade agreements between the EU and 
subregional groupings of ACP countries.
Cotonou stipulates that negotiations will take into account the level of development 
and the socio-economic impact of trade measures on ACP countries, as well as their capacity 
to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalisation process. Accordingly, negotiations 
will “be as flexible as possible in establishing a sufficient transition period, the final product 
coverage, and the degree of asymmetry in terms of the timetable for tariff dismantlement in 
conformity with WTO rules” (Cotonou Agreement, Article 37).
Part 5 of the Cotonou Agreement also contains specific provisions for the Least 
Developed, Landlocked and Island States (LDLICs). Article 84 specifies that ACP-EU 
cooperation will ensure special treatment for these countries, taking into account their 
particular economic vulnerability. With respect to island States, which include the 
Caribbean, the Agreement provides for specific provisions and measures to be established to 
assist these countries in their efforts to overcome “the natural and geographic difficulties and 
other obstacles” to their development (Cotonou Agreement, Article 89).
As part of the programme of assistance to Least Developed States, the EU has 
announced a “Everything But Arms” Decision (EBA), in which these countries will be 
granted duty and quota free entry all their exports except arms. This will undermine the 
Lomé IV preferences maintained under the Cotonou Agreement, for important Caribbean 
exports of rice, sugar and bananas. The programme will be phased in for bananas between 
2002 and 2006, for rice and sugar between 2006 and 2009.
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3.8 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
GSP, instituted under the auspices of UNCTAD in 1968, represents an important 
application of the principle of non-reciprocal S&D treatment in the global trading system 
(OAS 1996, p. 47). As such, GSP violates Article I of the GATT on MFN treatment. This 
has resulted in the creation of a legal exception to Article I, namely a special GATT waiver 
adopted in 1971, and subsequently the Enabling Clause adopted in 1979. There are currently 
16 different GSP schemes in 28 developed countries, including the 15 member States of the 
European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States.7
Besides non-reciprocity, GSP schemes are non-discriminatory, meaning that all 
developing countries are treated equally and because they are tailored to meet particular 
country objectives and priorities, these arrangements vary in the way they are designed. 
There are differences in areas such as eligibility rules, levels of tariff cuts, conditionalities, 
safeguards and rules of origin. Programmes generally grant preferences to manufactured or 
semi-manufactured goods and, to a lesser extent, some agricultural products excluding some 
items such as textiles. Developing countries are usually “graduated” from these schemes 
beyond a certain per capita income threshold or a “development index”, as in the case of the 
EU. In some instances, there is partial graduation for some products when exports of these 
products reach a certain threshold (OAS 1996, pp. 47-51). The idea is to ensure that GSP 
preferences accrue only to the low and middle-income countries.
The United States renewed its GSP scheme again in December 1999, with the 
enactment of legislation (HR 1180) that retroactively authorized the arrangement from 1 July 
1999 to 30 September 2001. This renewal enhances access for eligible Sub-Saharan African 
countries through the granting of duty-free treatment for more products from these countries. 
Thirty-eight Least Developed countries are eligible for a higher level of preferences, in that a 
wider range of their products are eligible and they are not subject to “competitive need 
limitations”.8 The products excluded from the GSP programme, e.g. textiles, watches, are 
currently granted preferential treatment in the latest Caribbean Basin Initiative. Products are 
also subject to strict rules of origin. The value of the materials produced in the beneficiary 
country, as well as the direct cost of processing, must equal 35 per cent of the appraised 
value of the product. Imported materials can meet the 35 per cent requirement only if  they 
are “substantially transformed” into new materials. However, the 35 per cent value added 
can be spread across more than one country when imported from GSP eligible members of 
certain regional groups such as the Andean Group and CARICOM 
(www.unctad.org/gsp/usa).
The Canadian GSP scheme (the General Preferential Tariff [GPT]) went into effect in 
1974, and has been renewed every 10 years. The latest renewal in 1994 provided expanded 
product coverage and lower GPT rates of duty. Like all GSP arrangements, both agricultural
7 New Zealand, Norway, Australia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Switzerland, also have GSP programmes 
in place. UNCTAD has established a website at: www.unctad.org/gsp, which provides details of GSP 
arrangements for all these countries, together with rules of origin regulations.
8 In essence, this means that GSP privileges can be terminated if during the calendar year, United States imports 
from a beneficiary country account for 50 per cent or more of the value of total United States imports of that 
product. In the case of “sufficiently competitive” products, the level is 25 per cent.
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and industrial products are covered, excluding certain textiles, footwear and products of 
chemical and plastic industries. With respect to rules of origin, goods must either be wholly 
produced in the beneficiary country, or the value of the import content must equal no more 
than 40 per cent of the ex-factory price, or 60 per cent, in the case of the Least Developed 
countries. Goods must be shipped directly from the beneficiary country to Canada, although 
transshipments are allowed under certain conditions. In other words, the goods must remain 
under customs control and must not enter trade or consumption in the intermediate country 
(www.unctad.org/gsp/canada).
Reductions in tariff barriers under the Uruguay Round will tend to erode preferential 
access for those developing country exports that enjoy preferential access under GSP 
schemes. In the case of the Caribbean, this erosion will only affect exports to developed 
countries outside the EU, the United States and Canada, as well as exports to the United 
States, Canada and the EU, which are not covered by either the CBTPA, CARIBCAN or the 
Cotonou Agreements, respectively. In reality then, the range of exports affected is quite 
small. However, according to one view, the impact of the Uruguay Round is in effect to 
make the diversification of exports into new Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) markets difficult for the Caribbean. Indeed, the exports of developed 
countries will enjoy greater tariff cuts than those of developing countries (Davenport, 1996,
p. 20).
3.9 The Free Trade Area of the Americas
The Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles, which launched the FTAA 
process, recognized the difficulties involved in the formation of a free trade area among 34 
countries, “particularly in view of the wide differences in the level of development and size 
of the economies existing in our hemisphere” (Summit of the Americas, 1994, p.3). In 
essence, this was the first time that multilateral negotiations at the outset specifically 
recognized the need to take into account the special circumstances of smaller developing 
countries. Accordingly, the heads of State committed the participating countries to facilitate 
the integration of the smaller economies into the FTAA and increase their level of 
development (Summit of the Americas, 1994, p. 8).
This was a reflection of the insistence of the Caribbean and Central American States 
that smaller economies not suffer adverse consequences from participation along with larger, 
and, in some cases more developed, economies in the FTAA. A Working Group on Smaller 
Economies was established in August 1995 to ensure that the needs of the smaller economies 
would be taken into account in the deliberations of all the FTAA Working Groups. This 
Working Group remained in place until September 1997, when it was converted into the 
Consultative Group on Smaller Economies. The creation of the Working Group was 
significant because it translated the recognition that smaller economies required special 
attention in the integration process, into empirical documentation of what specifically were 
the difficulties faced by this type of economy, and it initiated the discussion of appropriate 
measures to address these challenges. The Consultative Group deepened this debate and 
brought the results to the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) which took the decision to 
establish guidelines at its meeting in September 2001.
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In accordance with the Buenos Aires Ministerial Declaration (1997) and taking into 
account the recommendations of the Consultative Group on Smaller Economies, the Trade 
Negotiations Committee adopted a series of guidelines or directives for the treatment of 
differences in the levels of development and size of economies in the FTAA. The Committee 
pointed out that these initial proposals did not preclude the adoption of other guidelines or 
directives by the TNC. Furthermore, these measures should be consistent with the objectives 
and principles of the FTAA, set forth in Annex I of the San Jose Ministerial Declaration 
(1998). The TNC also agreed that the measures would:
1. Provide a flexible framework to accommodate the characteristics and needs of 
each one of the countries participating in the FTAA negotiations.
2. Be transparent, simple and easily applicable, while recognizing the degree of 
heterogeneity among the FTAA economies.
3. Be determined by each of the Negotiating Groups. Nevertheless, when issues 
refer to topics that were crosscutting or not confined to one Negotiating 
Group, it should be determined by the TNC or other entities designated by the 
TNC.
4. Be determined on the basis of case-by-case analysis (according to sectors, 
topics and country/countries).
5. Include transitional measures, which could be supported by technical 
cooperation programmes.
6. Take into account existing market access conditions among the countries of 
the hemisphere.
7. Consider longer periods for compliance with obligations (FTAA, Trade 
Negotiations Committee, 2001).
The TNC also agreed that the guidelines should be accompanied by a programme of 
complementary supporting measures, which could include:
1. A Hemispheric Cooperation Programme, and the Consultative Group on
Smaller Economies was instructed to draft a proposal to the TNC on this 
initiative, based on contributions from the Negotiating Groups.
2. Technical assistance and training during negotiations and the implementation
process.
Financial transfers
The question of financial transfers in the form of loans, grants and technical 
assistance in support of specific trade measures is an unresolved debate in the FTAA. The 
CARICOM countries have argued that trade liberalization creates opportunities which can
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only come to fruition if investment capital is available to create or expand productive 
capacity and improve competitiveness. Given that smaller developing countries are at a 
disadvantage in global financial markets regardless of their credit rating and quality of 
economic management, the CARICOM countries proposed the creation of a regional 
integration fund to finance the adjustment process. This proposal has been put forward on 
several occasions but there has been no agreement. Opponents have argued that such a fund 
is beyond the scope of a free trade agreement and outside of the jurisdiction of trade 
ministers. The latter point is one which can be overcome through consultations between 
trade ministers and finance ministers.
Financial transfers within the ambit of trade and cooperation agreements are not 
unprecedented as they were an integral component of succeeding Lomé Conventions 
between the EU and the ACP countries. Such transfers are also contemplated under the new 
Cotonou agreement. It has also been the practice for regional integration schemes to be 
accompanied by a regional development bank e.g. CARICOM and the Caribbean 
Development Bank and the Central American Common Market and the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration.
The success of the FTAA negotiations will depend on the extent to which it is truly an 
inclusive process, where proposals, such as these, are adopted to accommodate the smaller 
States, which constitute the majority in the FTAA. The United States will also have to do its 
part by making good faith gestures, such as abandoning discriminatory trade practices during 
the negotiating phase, rather than when an agreement is concluded. In this regard, Joseph 
Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank, has warned that the FTAA will not 
benefit either the Caribbean or Latin America unless the United States is willing to eliminate 
farm subsidies and import barriers on products such as sugar and beef, prior to 2005. If these 
are not eliminated, the FTAA will simply prolong an unequal relationship between the 
United States and the countries in the Hemisphere (Lucas, 2001).
4. Special and differential treatment and its impact 
on Caribbean Economies
Special and differential treatment schemes recognize that countries do not compete 
and trade on an equal footing. Countries at a higher stage of industrialisation and 
development have an advantage over developing economies. On a superficial level, special 
and differential treatment is thus conceived simply as a set of provisions allowing the latter to 
actively participate in multilateral trade schemes. At a more profound level special and 
differential treatment seeks ultimately to provide a basis for developing economies to 
undertake a 'catching up' process with the developed countries. S&D provisions are generally 
classified into those providing for time-limited derogations from obligations and longer 
periods for implementing obligations; more favourable thresholds to undertake certain 
commitments; flexibility in obligations and procedures; and best endeavour clauses.
The conceptual basis of special and differential treatment bears a striking resemblance 
to that underlying the infant industry argument put forward by economic development
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theorists in the late 1950s and 1960s. According to this argument, industries in developing 
economies require time to “learn the business” and to achieve the economies of scale 
required for competitive pricing. Given enough time and protection, infant industries can 
grow up, compete with industries in developed economies and forego the need for 
preferential or asymmetric treatment.
The analysis of the impact of special and differential treatment is an empirical issue. 
It is a question of showing, given the available data, if  special and differential treatment has 
achieved its expected goals. That is, whether it has led to greater export growth and 
diversification, and has thus created the conditions for economic development. In this section 
the analysis is undertaken for the Caribbean’s main export markets, namely the United States 
and Europe.
Trade in the Caribbean is highly concentrated towards North America and Western 
Europe (the EU). Between 1985 and 1999, more than 45 per cent of Caribbean countries’ 
imports, on average, originated in the United States and 17 per cent in Western Europe (see 
Table 3 below). Likewise, during the same period, Caribbean merchandise exports to both 
destinations represented more than 60 per cent of the total. 9
Exports that enter under preferential arrangements i.e. the CBI in the case of the 
United States and the Lomé and subsequently Cotonou agreements for Europe, represent a 
significant part of the total. In the case of Caribbean exports to the United States, available 
data for 11 Caribbean countries show that: (a) on average the share of CBI exports increased 
by 21 per cent in 1989, 27 per cent in 1995, 37 per cent in 1997 and 28 per cent in 2000; and 
(b) at the national level, countries exhibit important disparities. On average for 1989-2000, in 
the case of Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Antigua and Barbuda the share of 
CBI exports represents less than 15 per cent of the total. By contrast for the same period, 
CBI exports for Barbados and St. Kitts and Nevis represent 39 per cent and 49 per cent, 
respectively, of the total. Notwithstanding these differences most countries have increased 
their share of CBI exports (see Table 4 below).10
With respect to Caribbean exports to Europe, the data shows a decline for the great 
majority of countries under the Lomé Convention or Cotonou Agreement. As shown in Table 
5, these export products represent more than 75 per cent of total imports to Western Europe. 
Overall, between 1985 and 1999, they have registered a decrease of between 85 per cent and 
77 per cent of the total, largely due to the decrease in petroleum and fuel oil exports from 
Trinidad and Tobago.
9 Estimations based on ECLAC data.
10 Caribbean exports to the United States falling under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) were not 
taken into consideration since these represent a small percentage of the total. On average for 1989-2000, GSP 
exports represented for Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, 6.8%, 2.9%, 
10.4%, 6.2%, 6.9%, 4.2%, 2.5%, 1.5%, 0.4%, 1.6%, 5.9% and 1.0% of the total. Moreover in all cases, GSP 
preferences have steadily decreased form 1989 to 1999. On average GSP exports represented 5.1% of the total 
in 1989 and 1.4% in 2000.
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Table 3
CARICOM’s direction of trade 
Imports by origin (1985-1999)
Regional Block 1985 1990 1995 1999
NAFTA 47.4 48.1 50.1 47.4
Western Europe 18.8 17.4 16.6 16.3
CARICOM 7.7 7.9 9.1 9.7
Andean Community 5.9 6.7 6.2 8.7
Mercosur 2.3 3.9 2.4 1.9
CACM 1.1 0.7 0.8 1.1
Note: CACM = Central American Common Market. 
Source: Competitive Analysis of Nations (2001)
Table 4
Caribbean countries exports under the Caribbean Basin Initiative as a percentage of the total 
exported to the United States (1989 -  2000)
Country 1989 1992 1995 1997 2000 Average
Antigua and Barbuda 19 6.1 54.6 10.6 0.2 14.5
Barbados 29.2 71.0 33.9 59.3 27.6 39.1
Belize 33.5 40.5 32.6 45.7 38.1 32.6
Dominica 12.2 30.2 41.8 27.4 5.3 33.3
Grenada 28.0 15.4 14.9 60.9 61.1 33.4
Guyana 4.6 1.1 15.2 23.3 12.0 10.7
Jamaica 17.8 15.2 28.3 29.3 40.5 26.1
St. Kitts and Nevis 36.3 47.7 27.9 82.5 75.0 48.9
St. Lucia 1.3 2.7 4.7 2.9 14.8 6.2
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 51.4 3.6 32.4 54.7 22.0 35.5
Trinidad and Tobago 2.4 2.3 7.1 14.1 12.5 7.3
Source: Based on United States Trade Representative data for 1989 to 2000.
Table 5
Main CARICOM exports to Western Europe as a percent of the total (1985-1999)
Product 1985 1990 1995 1999
Aluminium Ores and concentrates 19.2 29.1 25.8 24.0
Sugars 15.3 12.1 14.3 13.2
Alcoholic beverages 4.1 5.6 7.0 12.8
Bananas 12.9 14.2 11.7 9.7
Ships and boats 0.7 16.0 10.4 5.0
Petroleum and fuel oils 21.0 2.1 1.9 4.0
Crustaceans and molluscs 0.4 1.4 1.7 3.0
Inorganic chemical elements 4.1 1.4 2.4
Rice 3.5 2.0 1.7 2.3
Aluminium 2.4 1.5 2.1 1.2
Garments 0.2 1.3 1.7
Medical and pharmaceutical 1.0 1.1
Jewellery 0.7 0.9
Total 85.3 88.7 78.4 77.3
Note: "..." data not available.
Source: Competitive Analysis of Nations (2001)
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Official assessments of the trade impact of special and differential treatment are 
mixed. The recent Fourth Report to Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (31 December 2001) states that: “the total U.S. dollar value of CBI 
exports to the United States in 2000 was $22.2 billion, or 2.5 times greater than in 1984” 
(page 1). Subsequently, (page 3), it goes on to state: “Collectively, the CBI countries rank 
ninth among U.S. market export destinations, ahead of countries such as France, Singapore 
and the Netherlands” .11 This optimistic outlook contrasts with that of the European Union. A 
report on the bilateral trade relations between ACP countries and Europe (July 2001) which 
looks at market share, indicates that ACP countries face increasing difficulties in integrating 
into the world economy, and that their share of exports to the European Community has 
decreased even in those periods when they most enjoyed preferences for market access.12
The available evidence for Caribbean countries supports this conclusion. Despite the 
importance of the United States and European markets, Caribbean countries have failed to 
increase or even maintain their overall market share. Between 1985 and 1999, the export 
market share of Caribbean countries in regional trading blocs such as NAFTA and the EU 
(Western Europe), has decreased from 0.71 per cent to 0.26 per cent and from 0.15 per cent 
to 0.10 per cent, respectively (see Table 6). It is worthy of note that the Caribbean’s market 
share has decreased as much in those markets that grant preferential access as in those where 
Caribbean economies compete on an equal footing with third countries. Also, historically 
more than half of the Caribbean market share in the EU is concentrated in Trinidad and 
Tobago and Jamaica.
Table 6
CARICOM’s market share in other regional trading blocks
In percentages 
1985-1999
Regional block 1985 1990 1995 1999
NAFTA 0.71 0.43 0.32 0.26
Western Europe 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10
Andean Community 0.40 0.96 0.41 0.30
Mercosur 0.30 0. 34 0.19 0.07
CACM 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.66
Source: Competitive Analysis of Nations (2001)
Market share can be disaggregated into a volume (volume share) and a value (relative 
unit value) component (see Table 7 below).13 Thus, as a first approximation, the decrease in 
market share can be explained by the interaction of both components. Available evidence for 
the United States market at the lowest level of disaggregation allowed by the Harmonised 
System Code (i.e, the 10-digit level of disaggregation) shows that in most cases value
11 In a similar way, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates that United States imports under the 
CBI programme, increased an average of 10.7 per cent annually from 1984-1999, while total imports worldwide 
to the United States increased by 7.4 per cent (IDB 2000, p. 1). However, the Bank partly attributes this 
performance to the dramatic growth in the United States economy.
12 See, Bilateral Trade Relations. ACP countries (77). July 2001. Europa. European Union. Also see, European 
Commission. Green paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 
21st century. 20 November, 1996.
13 For a more detailed explanation see, MAGIC. User's Manual (2001). ECLAC.
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changes accounted for the decrease in market share. 14 Table 7 shows that three out of eight 
main export products experienced declines in volume, but that five products out of eight 
registered decreases in the value or price component of market share.
Table 7
Volume share and relative price changes for main Caribbean export products
1995 -  1999
Product Volume share change 
In percentages
Relative price change 
In percentages
Crude petroleum testing -7% 0.9
Anhydrous Ammonia 40% -10
Aluminium Oxide 52% -10
No. 6 type fuel 40% 2
Aluminium ores 5 -8
Methanol 100 -16
Panty hose -56 17
Men’s or boys cotton underwear -66 -3
Note: The products here analysed belong to the lowest level of desaggregation under the United States 
harmonised system code. Volume share is defined as the ratio of the bilateral to the global export volume to 
the United States.
Source: Module to Analyze the Growth of International Commerce (MAGIC) (2001).
Beyond an analysis on volume and price changes stands a more fundamental issue. 
Special and differential treatment is granted at a point in time for a period of time. It 
ultimately responds to the requirements and priorities of the country granting the trade 
preference and to the lobbying power of the interest groups of the beneficiary countries. 
Europeans view bananas as an important consumption item. In the same vein, the more 
recent extension of the Caribbean Basin Initiative to cover apparel products under the 
enactment of the United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA, May, 2000) 
was partly due to the significance of out-sourcing for United States firms.
As a result, special and differential treatment may be divorced from, and not be 
responsive to, the factors that determine export competitiveness. In particular, special and 
differential treatment is not conceived as a scheme to promote export potential on the basis of 
the production possibilities of the developing countries involved. In this sense, the export 
pattern determined by S&D treatment may not correspond to the changes in the production 
structure of economies (i.e. to structural change). In the cases where it has corresponded to a 
structural change in the economies involved it has been an engine for economic growth.
During the 1990s, on average, Caribbean economies experienced a change in the 
sectoral composition of output from agriculture to the services sector, with a stagnant 
manufacturing sector. In terms of weighted averages, agriculture accounted for 13.5 per cent 
of output in 1990 and 9.5 per cent in 1999. For the same years, manufacturing represented
12.6 per cent and 11.56 per cent. The service sector increased its contribution to output from 
39 per cent to 47 per cent (see Table 8, below). 15
14 The computations of the volume share and relative unit price require export volumes and these were available 
only for the United States.
15 The data on agriculture excludes Guyana. The country experienced a 300% increase in sugarcane production 
between 1990 and 2000, which as shown in Table 3, distorts the average for the region.
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Yet, with a few exceptions, during the same period, there were no significant changes 
in the export structure of Caribbean countries. For example, in the case of exports to Europe, 
natural resource and agricultural commodities remained throughout the 1990s the most 
important exports. Aluminium, sugar, bananas and alcoholic beverages represented more 
than 50 per cent of the total exported in 1985 and in 1999 (see Table 8, above). The 
exception to this rule is Trinidad and Tobago.
In the 1990s Trinidad and Tobago, an oil-producing country, switched its productive 
structure from oil to natural gas and other manufacturing products. This change in its 
production structure was accompanied by a change in its export pattern. As Table 3 shows, 
between 1985 and 1999, petroleum and fuel oils lost substantial market share in the European 
market decreasing from 21 per cent of total CARICOM exports to 4 per cent. At the same 
time methanol exports, a recent successful Trinidadian product, increased by 100 per cent in 
volume terms between 1995 and 1999 (see Table 7, above). Trinidad and Tobago was the 
only country in the CARICOM region (besides Guyana) that registered higher rates of GDP 
growth with lower GDP growth volatility in the 1990s relative to that of the 1980s.16
Table 8 
Sectoral share of output 
1990 and 2000 
Percentages
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Tourism
Financial
Services Other services
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Antigua/Barbuda 4.2 4.9 2.0 2.2 3.4 2.8 14.44 14.40 7.2 11.2 18.9 25.1
Barbados 7.3 6.1 0.8 0.9 10.0 9.3 13.90 14.96 0.0 0.0 7.8 8.3
Belize 18.4 21.0 0.7 0.8 17.2 17.2 19.23 19.75 5.1 5.2 25.2 24.8
Dominica 25.0 18.2 0.8 0.8 7.1 7.2 2.06 2.44 11.3 13.2 16.2 20.9
Grenada 13.4 10.1 0.4 0.6 6.6 9.9 5.80 11.79 7.8 12.9 20.1 30.5
Guyana 23.6 35.4 9.5 10.9 11.1 11.7 6.0 5.7 8.7 8.5
Jamaica 6.2 7.1 8.7 9.1 21.1 15.8 9.2 14.9 9.4 16.9
St. Kitts/Nevis 6.5 3.8 0.4 0.5 12.9 14.3 7.62 8.97 8.0 19.3 15.0 17.6
St. Lucia 14.6 7.7 0.4 0.5 8.2 5.9 9.60 13.28 7.3 10.6 16.8 20.0
St. Vincent/Grenadines 21.1 12.0 0.3 0.3 8.5 5.8 2.23 2.48 7.6 9.6 20.5 25.2
Suriname 9.3 11.1 9.1 17.8 13.0 10.6 12.13 10.56 17.8 9.3 5.4 8.9
Trinidad/Tobago 1.9 1.8 57.7 56.5 4.5 6.0 5.73 7.36 5.0 4.7 5.9 6.2
Weighted Average a/ 17.18 18.58 39.44 36.84 12.66 11.57 39.07 46.63
Weighted average for 
agriculture 
without Guyana 13.50 9.50
Note: data not available. Other services include communications and transport.
a/ The weighted average was estimated was calculated for agriculture, manufacturing and the service sector as a 
whole (including tourism, 
transport and communications).
Source: ECLAC (2001).
16 See, IMF (2000). Itam S. et al. Development and Challenges in the Caribbean Region. International Monetary 
Fund. Washington D.C. Table 2. p. 7.
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The lack of correlation between the export and the production structures has had two 
important consequences for Caribbean economies.
First, it reinforces the constraint to fulfil existing quotas granted by preferential trade 
arrangements. This has caused some to question the usefulness and efficiency of special and 
differential treatment. In the Caribbean, the inability to fulfil existing quotas may be due to a 
series of factors including: the lack of managerial capacity, poor organization, weak 
institutions, a slow response to a changing environment and the lack of technological 
capacity.
But it also has to be recognised that patterns of structural change in the Caribbean 
have meant a shift in the orientation of resources from the traditional sectors, such as 
agriculture, to the non-traditional services sector. A lower level of resources reinforces the 
difficulty of meeting export commitments or undertaking restructuring processes required by 
productive activities to comply with multilateral obligations.
For example, prior to the European modification of the import banana regime in 
2001, the European Union granted quotas of 71,000 tons, 127,000 tons, 82,000 tons and 
14,000 tons to Dominica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, respectively. 
But the quantities actually exported for the period 1993-1999 were on average, 37,204 tons, 
89,756 tons, 41,638 tons and 2,318 tons, representing 52 per cent, 71 per cent, 51 per cent 
and 17 per cent, respectively, of their total quota. 17 In his analysis of the Windward Islands 
banana sector, Sandiford (2000, p. 46) provides an explanation for this shortfall. He writes:
“It was commonly agreed that the critical factor in the adjustment 
process was the need to enhance the quality of bananas produced by the 
industry so as to increase its international competitiveness. At the same time, 
the institutional arrangements for management and governance of the industry 
were identified as areas in need of realignment. In addition to the structural 
deficiencies in the areas of management and governance, all of the BGASs 
were in serious financial difficulties. The financial constraint added 
complications to the adjustment process as limited resources were available 
for its financing”.
Second, the mismatch between production and export structures constrains the 
capacity of Caribbean countries to exploit their export potential and thus to diversify their 
export base and enhance their growth.
The export performance of Caribbean countries can be also measured by the ratio of 
exports to the average propensity of import (i.e.the ratio of imports to GDP). When exports 
are equal to imports, the export performance ratio is equal to GDP. When exports are greater 
(less) than imports, the export performance ratio is greater (smaller) than GDP. Table 9 
shows the export performance ratio for selected Caribbean economies. With the exception of 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, for all countries the export performance ratio was below
17 See European Union Council Regulation 404/93. WIBDECO and Sandiford (2000).
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GDP indicating a disequilibrium in the balance of trade. Moreover, from 1985 to 1999, it 
decreased for all countries, showing that the export performance deteriorated.
Table 9
Export performance for selected Caribbean countries, 1985-1999
Export performance 1985 1990 1995 1999
Antigua and Barbuda 0.12 0.15 0.09
Barbados 0.58 0.30 0.31 0.24
Belize 0.70 0.61 0.63 0.45
Dominica 0.51 0.47 0.38 0.46
Grenada 0.33 0.25 0.18 0.13
Guyana 0.67 0.83
Jamaica 1.14 1.14 0.50 0.43
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.72 0.65
Trinidad and Tobago 1.56 1.11 1.43 0.75
Note: export performance is calculated as the ratio of merchandise exports to the average propensity to 
import.




United States and European market share and import structure for Caribbean countries 1985-1999
1985 1990 1995 1999
The European market - European import market share
1. Natural resource exports 16.01 13.64 13.1 11.14
2. Natural resource based manufacturing exports 33.89 25.97 23.57 20.7
3. Manufacturing exports not based on natural resources 46.67 56.99 59.14 63.77
Low technology 20.26 23.39 24.49 24.65
Medium technology 26.41 33.60 34.65 39.12
4. Other exports 1.76 1.94 2.58 2.88
Caribbean export structure to Europe
1. Natural resource exports 55.68 61.61 59.81 56.23
2. Natural resource based manufacturing exports 25.43 11.12 14.87 2305
3. Manufacturing exports not based on natural resources 13.02 25.82 24.9 19.15
Low technology 10.82 8.36 11.75 11.30
Medium technology 2.20 17.46 13.15 7.85
4. Other exports 1.49 1.47 0.32 1.03
The United States market - United States import market share
1. Natural resource exports 9.1 7.91 7.03 6.23
2. Natural resource based manufacturing exports 31.32 28.42 26.06 25.08
3. Manufacturing exports not based on natural resources 54.88 59.35 62.52 63.64
Low technology 13.23 15.61 15.91 16.62
Medium technology 41.65 43.74 46.61 47.06
4. Other exports 3.35 3.28 3.46 4.06
Caribbean export structure to the United States
1. Natural resource exports 19.21 25.25 25.45 26.46
2. Natural resource based manufacturing exports 66.11 55.23 41.1 44.18
3. Manufacturing exports not based on natural resources 11.25 14.80 22.93 17.54
Low technology 4.77 12.90 20.47 14.95
Medium technology 6.48 1.91 2.46 2.59
4. Other exports 1.97 3.20 8.94 9.44
Note: Export performance is calculated as the ratio of merchandise exports to the average propensity to 
import.
Source: On the basis of USTR data, MAGIC (2001), CAN (2001) and IMF financial statistics (Several 
issues).
Table 10 shows the evolution of the composition of Caribbean countries exports to 
the United States and Europe. Exports are classified in four categories. These are: exports 
based on natural resources, natural resource based manufacturing exports, manufacturing 
exports that are not based on natural resources and other exports. In turn, the manufacturing 
exports that are not based on natural resources are classified into low and medium technology 
exports.18
18 This classification of exports follows the methodology of Mortimore and Peres. Exports based on natural 
resources include basic products. Natural resource based manufacturing exports include wood, metal, oil, 
cement, glass products. Manufacturing exports not based on natural resources of low technology include apparel 
and garments and other products such as jewellery. Manufacturing exports not based on natural resources of
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Between 1985 and 1999, Caribbean counties have maintained or increased the share 
of natural resource based exports. In the case of the United States, it has increased from 19 
per cent to 27 per cent. In the case of Europe it has remained above 50 per cent. Resource 
based manufacturing exports have declined (66 per cent to 44 per cent in the case of the 
United States and 25 per cent to 23 per cent in the case of Europe). Finally, manufacturing 
exports that are not based on natural resources have increased, due to the increasing 
importance of the apparel industry in the case of the United States. In the case of Europe, the 
increase responds mainly to the external sales of ships and boats.
This pattern does not necessarily correspond with the evolution of the composition of 
external demand. In both the United States and European markets, natural resources have lost 
market share and manufacturing exports not based on natural resources that are of medium 
technology represent the most important component of their import market and have steadily 
increased.
Taking into account two time periods 1990-1994 and 1994-1999, a brief survey of 
more than 2000 products at the 10 digit level exported by Caribbean countries to the United 
States shows that: (a) more than 30 per cent of the total corresponded to products combining 
a declining regional share in dynamic products (i.e., products increasing their United States 
market share); (b) between both periods of time there has been a decline in percentage of the 
products whose relative importance in the United States market has increased; (c) likewise 
there has been an increase in the percentage of the products whose relative importance in 
United States markets has decreased (26 per cent and 33 per cent of the total in 1990-1994 
and 1994-1999).19
More importantly, the evolution of the export structure highlights the fact that the 
basis on which special and differential treatment is granted may have reinforced an existing 
trade pattern based on comparative advantage, that is, on natural resources and low labor 
costs.
Caribbean economies remain dependent on primary commodities. On average during 
the 1990s, sugar, molasses and rum represented a quarter of total exports for Barbados and 
Guyana and more than a third for St. Kitts and Nevis. Bauxite and aluminia accounted for 
more than 40 per cent of total exports in the case of Jamaica and more than 70 per cent in the 
case of Suriname (IMF, 2000). In addition, despite its poor export performance, the banana 
sector represented, in the case of Winward Islands, more than 6 per cent of GDP in 1998 and 
18 per cent of the labor force (Sandiford, 2000).
The failure to enhance export growth and increase diversification has been 
accompanied by a continued growth in imported merchandise. Imports are mainly driven by 
consumption. As shown in Table 11 below in eight out of the 12 Caribbean countries 
considered, consumer goods account for more than half of total imports. In turn consumer 
goods have accounted historically for a significant share of expenditure (see Table 12). In
medium technology include machinery and equipment, automobile parts, pharmaceutical products. Other 
products include non-classified products.
19 The computations were carried out with MAGIC (2001).
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2000, consumption accounts for more than 80 per cent of national expenditure. Thus, as 
expenditure increases, consumption and imports follow pari passu.
Table 11
The importance of consumption in total imports 
1994 -  1998
Percentage Countries
Above 60% of total imports Dominica.
Between 50% and 60% of total imports Bahamas, Belize, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
Between 40% and 50% of total imports Barbados
Between 30% and 40% of total imports
Between 30% and 20% of total imports Suriname, Jamaica, Guyana
Below 20% of total imports Trinidad and Tobago
Source: IMF (2001)
Table 12
Levels of consumption relative to total expenditure 
In percentages 
1965 - 2000
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Antigua and Barbuda 65.6 71.8 67.2
Barbados 85.9 77.4 76.7 83.7 81.7 84.9
Belize 73.8 87.8 91.2 74.8 81.1 83.6
Dominica 97.4 120.7 94.9 85.2 84.6 83.9
Grenada 94.1 100.4 99.0 83.7 84.05 83.0
Guyana 80.1 77.5 67.0 81.7 89.4 74.5
Jamaica 84.7 72.6 84.6 86.2 84.9 76.2 81.0 84.3
St. Kitts and Nevis 93.4 92.1 91.8 76.0 77.3 100.3
St. Lucia 97.2 91.0 84.0 77.9 91.3
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
100.4 111.7 86.0 79.9 84.2 80.9
Suriname 79.2 76.7 68.8 78.9 88.7
Trinidad and Tobago 78.9 73.0 54.9 57.9 77.4 70.5 64.7 62.8
Note: .... denotes not available.
Source: On the basis of IMF International Financial Statistics (Several issues) and ECLAC (2001)
The overall result of an export structure ‘landlocked’ by special and differential 
treatment and an import pattern driven by the dynamism of consumption is to make the 
external constraint more binding. Most Caribbean economies have increased their trade 
deficit during the last decade. In addition, with a few exceptions, tourism earnings and 
remittances have not been sufficient to close the gap. This has made most economies 
dependent on foreign direct investment flows and official assistance aid.
Yet foreign direct investment flows have been concentrated in a few countries. 
Between 1990 and 1999, Trinidad and Tobago accounted for the lion’s share of foreign direct
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investment (45 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively) followed by Jamaica (23 per cent and 
24 per cent, respectively).
At the intraregional level, the same pattern is found for investment and for trade flows 
(see Table 10).20 This process compounded simply intensifies existing disparities in terms of 
income per capita and stages of development that are found in Caribbean countries (IMF, 
2000). It also calls into question the Special Regime for LDCs found in the Chaguaramas 
Treaty (1973) and ultimately could lead to the fragmentation of the Caribbean subregion.
Table 13
Percentage distribution of extraregional and intraregional foreign direct investment
in Caribbean countries (1990-1999)
Averages
Countries Share in extraregional foreign 
direct investment 
Percentage of total
Share in intraregional 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Percentage of total








St. Kitts and Nevis 3.0 3.0
St. Lucia 5.0 5.1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2.6 2.7
Suriname 0.0 -2.1
Trinidad and Tobago 44.9 46.2
Total 100 100
Source: ECLAC (2001)
Overall special and differential treatment has not been associated with increasing 
market share, higher export growth or with a greater diversification of the export base. As it 
stands, it has reinforced and perhaps determined a pattern of trade flows that does not 
correspond to the changes actually occurring in the production sphere. This pattern of trade 
flows is characterised by reliance on natural resource exports and low labor costs. The 
mismatch between trade and production structures has not allowed exports to keep up with 
the dynamism in imports, mainly driven by consumption. This has important ramifications 
for the balance of payments position and the process of Caribbean regional integration.
20 Computations for intraregional trade flows were carried out with the software Competitive Analysis of 
Nations (2001). The results show that in 1985 Trinidad and Tobago accounted for 36% of intraregional trade. 
This percentage increased to 57% in 1999.
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5. Proposals to apply special and differential treatment meaningfully
to developing economies
The principle of special and differential treatment posits that discrimination in favour 
of developing countries is beneficial to their economic development. However, as has been 
analysed in the previous section, the application of this principle in the Caribbean has not 
lived up to expectations. Nevertheless, there are individual successes. Some exports that 
have benefited from preferential tariff rates and exemptions in quota requirements have 
expanded. But the results are “patchy “ at best. This has questioned the usefulness of special 
and differential treatment.
Special and differential treatment will be further eroded by the impending conflict 
between multilateral agreements based on the principle of non-discrimination and 
preferential treatment which requires a waiver to that principle. As the WTO principles and 
free trade gain wide support in the face of globalisation there will be a narrower basis for 
supporting and justifying special and differential treatment. Moreover, the competition for 
aid and special privileges leads some developing economies to adopt a position that questions 
the legitimacy of special and differential treatment. For example, in the WTO banana case, 
Ecuador, Costa Rica and other developing economies questioned the special and differential 
European import regime granted to ACP because it discriminated against their production 
and exports. In the same way, some Caribbean countries have questioned the Cotonou 
Agreement due to the importance it gives to less developed countries. A higher allocation of 
resources for these countries in effect means a lower level of resources for the Caribbean 
region.
Yet for all its weaknesses it is clear that special and differential measures remain 
important for the vast majority of developing countries. The demise of these arrangements 
would have dire social and economic consequences.21 Indeed, many proposals have been put 
forward for a more efficient and realistic framework for special and differential treatment.22 
The most recent proposal views S&D treatment as a fundamental element of the multilateral 
trading system. 23 Building on these and the evidence presented in the last section, the 
following principles can be suggested for a meaningful application of special and differential 
treatment.
First, special and differential measures should provide a stable framework for firms 
involved in export activities.
21 Sandiford (2000, p. 152) estmated that a scenario of liberalisation in the banana industry in the Winward 
Islands could result on average in a 66% increase in the rate of unemployment.
22 See for example, WTO Market Access under Special and Differential Treatment for Small Developing 
Economies. Proposal by Swaziland. G/AG/NG/W/95. 22 December 2000. Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial 
Conference. Negoatiations on Agriculture. Special and Differential Treatment. Communications from Australia. 
WT/GC/W/167. 9 April 1999. Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in World 
Agricultural Trade. Submission by ASEAN. G/AG/NG/W/55. 10 November, 2000. Special and Differential 
Treatment and Proposals. WT/c Om TD/W/85. 14 May 2001. Preparations for the Fourth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference. WT/GC/W/442. 19 September 2001.
23 See, WT/GC/W/442
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Second, S&D treatment should maintain the spirit of paragraph 5 of the Enabling
Clause:
“The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments 
made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and developing countries, i.e., the developed countries do not 
expect the developing countries, in the course of the negotiations, to make 
contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, 
financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore, not 
seek, neither less developed contracting parties be required to make, 
concessions that are inconsistent with the latter’s development, financial and 
trade needs”.
Third, special and differential treatment should be based on the principle of 
contractuality, as with the Lomé trade preferences. These should be jointly agreed and not 
modified unilaterally by the granting country.
Fourth, special and differential treatment should not be a set of homogeneous 
measures. It should be recognized that developing countries are heterogeneous in their 
production structures as well as in their stages of development. These disparities should 
result in a differentiated approach.
Fifth, special and differential treatment should not only focus on market access and 
thus, export performance, which is the main focus of the current proposals. Imports should 
also be incorporated. Imports can be a channel for the transfer of technology and for research 
and development. This would allow for the development of a more technologically oriented 
composition of exports.
Sixth, empirical evidence shows that while there is no automatic link between trade 
liberalisation and growth, free trade can enhance growth through the promotion of 
investment. This should be a vital, if not the essential part of S&D treatment.
This leads to an important proposal. Special and differential treatment cannot be 
divorced from the rest of the economy. It must correspond to the structural changes that 
characterize the evolution of economies over time. It must be an evolving and dynamic 
concept rather than a static one. In practical terms it means that it must be “situated in a 
sectoral context” . As stated by Godley and Cripps (1983, p.44): “The evolution of whole 
economies, like their political systems, must be highly contingent historical process”. So 
must be the concept and framework of special and differential treatment. Given the evidence 
presented of structural change in the case of Caribbean economies (see Table 6 above), a 
framework for special and differential treatment must therefore also include services.
These proposals are valid for all economies and specially for smaller sized economies 
as they should be part of a strategy to build capacity to confront the challenges of 
globalization. Such a strategy should also concentrate in creating compensation mechanisms
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to avoid excessive gains and losses to individual sectors caused by changes in the direction of 
economic policy.
Smaller economies have characteristics which affect their capacity to participate in 
and benefit from international trade. These countries constitute a large part of the 
membership of the multilateral and regional trading arrangements, such as the WTO and a 
future FTAA. In addition, their effective participation in trade negotiations on both a 
multinational and regional basis will enhance both their own development and that of the 
global economy, international trade agreements must take account of their circumstances. 
Therefore future trade agreements such as the FTAA, must incorporate in their objectives, 
disciplines and schedules, measures specifically designed to facilitate the effective 
participation of smaller economies.
Within this scenario appropriate provisions specific to smaller economies can be 
grouped under seven headings (Bernal, 2001).
1. A lower level of obligations
Smaller economies would be required to undertake commitments and concessions to 
the extent consistent with their adjustment capacity, development, financial and trade needs, 
and their administrative and institutional capabilities for implementation. This should be 
negotiated on an issue-by-issue basis and, where appropriate, a product-by-product basis.
2. Asymmetrically phased implementation timetables
Given the smaller size of firms in smaller economies and the smaller scale of 
production and limited size of the market, export sectors will require a longer period of 
adjustment than larger firms and larger, more developed economies. Hence, there must be 
asymmetrically phased implementation of rules and disciplines, permitting a longer 
adjustment period for smaller economies. For example, in agricultural trade, in particular, 
food items, smaller economies should be allowed the flexibility to implement their 
commitments to reduction of protection and domestic support over a longer period than the 
implementation period prescribed for larger economies.
3. Best endeavor commitments
Both larger and smaller economies should commit to best endeavors in 
implementation of S&D treatment: (a) Larger economies should, wherever possible, provide 
measures and accept timetables, which provide consideration to smaller economies. For 
example, careful regard should be given by developed countries to the peculiar situation of 
smaller economies when considering the imposition of antidumping duties. Larger, more 
developed economies should be required to explore the possibility of constructive remedies 
(i.e. price undertakings) before imposing duties where these would affect the essential 
interests of smaller economies; (b) Where flexibility is provided, there should be some 
criteria to assess the extent to which smaller economies are making adequate efforts, for
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example, when smaller economies have achieved “export competitiveness” in a given 
product they would be expected to phase out concessions over an extended period.
4. Exemptions from commitments in certain areas
Given the vast disparities in size, the extremely smaller size of some economies and 
the human, financial and institutional cost involved in implementing new trade agreements, 
such as the FTAA, smaller economies should be permitted some exemptions. This would not 
only address the question of disparities, but also avoid delays, which may occur because 
smaller economies, despite their best effort, were not able to meet certain requirements and 
timetables. For example, if, as is likely, exports subsidies are outlawed, smaller economies 
should be exempt from this requirement, or standardizing technical requirements through 
national organizations and participation in international standardization processes where 
these have no applicability because of lack of production or importation or exports. Where 
complete exemptions are not feasible, the minimum provisions would be helpful.
5. Flexibility in application and adherence of disciplines under prescribed circumstances
Smaller economies are highly open economies and are therefore more susceptible to 
balance of payments problems. This is particularly the case for smaller developing countries 
where balance of payments deficits tend to be persistent because of their structural origins. 
For example, the FTAA process might consider balance of payment provisions such as those 
provided in Articles XII and XIII of the GATT. It should be noted that these provisions are 
not confined to any particular type of country, but all members may avail themselves of the 
right resort to these provisions under the circumstances prescribed. Smaller economies, 
because of their vulnerability to balance of payment problems, should be permitted additional 
facilities to enable them to: (a) maintain sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able 
to grant the tariff protection required for the establishment of a particular industry; and (b) 
apply quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes which take full account of 
the continued high level of demand for imports likely to be generated by their programmes of 
economic development.
6. Enabling access to mediation
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes is 
currently under review in light of the experiences of the past few years. The problems, which 
have been identified with the operations of the dispute settlement mechanism include: (a) the 
limited capability of smaller countries to make use of the mechanism because of their 
inadequate expertise and institutional capacity to implement panel findings; (b) the high cost 
and administrative difficulties of using the dispute settlement mechanism.
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7. Technical assistance and training
The promise of technical assistance to the smaller economies is now widely accepted. 
Such assistance could: -
(a) Contribute to efforts by smaller economies to undertake the structural, 
institutional and legislative adjustment;
(b) Promote the development of adequate institutional capacity, including training 
to improve their handling of negotiations, and implementation of the 
international trade agreements;
(c) Assist smaller economies in fulfilling their obligations under the various 
international agreements, particularly in commitments under the WTO
No trade agreement and no set of relevant and meaningful special and differential 
measures should be expected to rectify structural and market weakenesses at the national 
level. A special and differential framework, such as that described, is unlikely to generate 
welfare gains for smaller economies unless it is accompanied by internal policies aiming at 
reducing their vulnerability.
In this sense, smaller States, such as those in the Caribbean, must see any new 
preferential provisions in trade agreements not as ends in themselves, but as a temporary 
means to facilitate adjustment to the demands of globalization. In a new trading environment 
of reciprocity, smaller States and developing countries, in general, must use the “breathing 
room” provided by preferences to undertake the necessary structural changes to become 
competitive in international markets. This will include strategies such as: (a) orienting the 
economy towards new types on activity based on global trends; (b) rationalizing and 
modernizing existing production and revitalizing traditional exports; and (c) improving 
international marketing techniques to keep abreast of world demand (Bernal, 1998, p. 16). 
There is already recognition in the Caribbean that fundamental structural reforms or 
“strategic global repositioning” (Bernal, 1996) needs to be implemented or the region will be 
marginalized in the international economy. Furthermore, that it is only through improving 
the competitiveness of Caribbean countries that they will be in a better position to undertake 
the reciprocal obligations in the WTO, FTAA and bilateral trade agreements.
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